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Abstract
IS research has considered the outsourcing decision from the
perspective of transaction cost economics (TCE) and institu-
tional theory.  In this research, we consider how the appro-
priation of the logic of transaction cost economics is contin-
gent on decision makers’ institutional context.  The institu-
tional contexts contrasted are professional versus political
1Ritu Agarwal was the accepting senior editor for this paper.  Patrick Chau
was the associate editor.  Tim Goles and Koh Siew Kuan served as reviewers.
The third reviewer chose to remain anonymous.
2An earlier version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the Academy
of Management Conference, August 2001.
contexts.  In a survey of 214 city governments in the United
States, we substantiate the existence of these two institutional
contexts, a distinction that has been noted to extend into the
private sector as well.
Subsequent analyses of the moderating effects of institutional
context on the application of the TCE heuristic to the
outsourcing decision revealed the following:  The institutional
context moderated the impacts of “human frailty” condi-
tions—of opportunism and bounded rationality—and of trans-
action frequency on outsourcing decisions.  In professional
contexts, opportunism reduced outsourcing and frequency
increased outsourcing; in political contexts, bounded ration-
ality fostered outsourcing and frequency dissuaded out-
sourcing.  However, no institutional moderation was noted
for the situational conditions of asset specificity and uncer-
tainty.  Instead, situational conditions were found to increase
the incidence of outsourcing across both contexts.
Findings about the contingent effects of human frailty
conditions augment our understanding of the outsourcing
phenomenon by emphasizing that decision makers’ attentive-
ness to the logic of transaction costs during outsourcing is
shaped by their institutional context.  Findings with regard to
situational conditions suggest a need for future research to
consider the role of another contextual factor—resource
munificence—in mitigating the effects of situational condi-
tions on responses to transaction costs.
Keywords:  IS outsourcing, transaction costs, institutional
environment
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Introduction
The rationality of organizational activities is often co-opted
and constrained by institutional forces that render it cere-
monial rather than instrumental (Meyer and Rowan 1977).
This is no less the case with the rationality underlying infor-
mation systems activities such as outsourcing.  Two lines of
institutional thought are visible in IS outsourcing research.
The first is the belief that forces external to the organization
constrain choices (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  This is repre-
sented in research considering the extent to which decision
makers accede to or resist outsourcing-related environmental
forces in their outsourcing decisions (Ang and Cummings
1997).  The second is the view that organizational configura-
tions emerge from institutionalized “templates for organizing”
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991, p. 27; also Greenwood and
Hinings 1996).  Such configurations have been visible in the
patterns of firms’ contracting choices while sourcing the IS
function (Lee et al. 2004).
Research has yet to consider how the pervasive normative,
cognitive, and regulatory structures within organizations—
structures that are not specific to outsourcing—configure
disparate contexts for decision making about outsourcing
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Zucker 1987).  The objective
of this paper is to empirically examine the premise that
organizations’ structures constitute disparate institutional con-
texts, which differentially constrain the application of
decision-making rules in outsourcing the IS function.  The
specific decision-making rule being investigated here is trans-
action cost economics.  
Transaction cost economics (TCE) has been a dominant
perspective in the investigation of boundary decisions.  As per
this view, organizational decision makers seek to balance
transaction and production costs in their decision to inter-
nalize or externalize a transaction.  Transaction costs accrue
from conditions engendering information impactedness,
where one partner to the exchange is privy to information that
remains hidden from the other.  Under such conditions, the
theory holds, decision makers will opt to internalize the
transaction (Williamson 1975).  The normative version of this
theory, which has diffused widely among practitioners,
suggests that decision makers should internalize transactions
susceptible to transaction costs (Ghoshal and Moran 1996).
However, researchers also note that the logic of transaction
costs cannot be considered in isolation of the decision
maker’s social environment (e.g., Noorderhaven 1996;
Roberts and Greenwood 1997).  Therefore, the question this
paper seeks to answer is:  How do different institutional
contexts affect the way in which decision makers employ the
logic of transaction cost economics in outsourcing decisions?
In answering this question, this research differs from prior
institutional investigations of the IS outsourcing decision in
the following ways.  First, it considers a less widespread
variant of institutional theory:  the institutionalizing effects of
norms and beliefs subscribed to within organizations (Zucker
1987), rather than the institutionalizing effects of forces
emanating from organizations’ external environment (e.g.,
Ang and Cummings 1997; Loh and Venkatraman 1992).
Second, it highlights how the pervasive institutional context,
constituted by different configurations of institutional
structures, circumscribes the rationality pertaining to IS
outsourcing.  In contrast, prior research has only considered
how institutional forces or field practices specific to IS
outsourcing influence IS outsourcing choices.  Third, this
research considers the manner in which outsourcing decisions
are shaped by institutional forces, rather than considering
decision making simply in terms of acquiescence or resistance
to institutional forces (Oliver 1991).
 
The city governments that are the focus of this study offer a
unique opportunity to examine institutional contexts.  Their
proximity to the state reinforces the salience of the institu-
tional context in organizational decision making (e.g., Dobbin
and Dowd 1997).  More importantly, institutional forces have
culminated in the emergence of disparate institutional
forms—those that favor professional management and those
dedicated to political equilibrium via recognizing and
balancing the power of multiple stakeholders.  While the city
government context carves out these distinctions in insti-
tutional contexts in stark relief, such contextual disparities are
not limited to the public sector alone, but are increasingly
visible within the private sector (e.g., Dixit 1997).
In the following sections, we overview the theoretical bases
for this work (i.e., institutional theory and transaction cost
economics) and existing research on IS outsourcing that has
drawn upon these theoretical foundations.  We then briefly
consider the history of city governments in the United States,
culminating in the dichotomization of professional and
political institutional contexts.  Based on these foundations,
we develop a model proposing institutional mitigation of the
application of the TCE heuristic.  We report on results of
testing this model via a survey of city governments and
consider the implications of our findings for practice and
future research.
Institutionalizing the Economic
Logic of IS Outsourcing
Institutions are socially constructed “rules of the game.”
They are combinations of formal and informal structures
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(North 1990) that are both constraining and enabling
(Giddens 1979; Jepperson 1991).  Functionally, they are
believed to exist so as “to reduce the uncertainties involved in
human interaction…as a consequence of both the complexity
of the problems to be solved and the problem-solving
software possessed by the individual” (North 1990, p. 25).  In
other words, institutions mitigate the situational and human
constraints on economic activity.  When exchanges are not
repeated, entail a large number of players, and are subject to
information asymmetry, institutions alter the cost-benefit
structure so as to encourage cooperation (North 1994).
Institutional theorists have ascribed the institutionalization of
organizations to sources internal or external to the organi-
zation (Zucker 1987).  Following arguments advanced by
Berger and Luckmann (1966), the internal-to-organizations
perspective considers institutions as the persistent patterning
of activities via social constructions by organizational mem-
bers.  In contrast, the external-to-organizations perspective
considers the influence of forces emanating from the external
environment on the persistent patterning of organizational
activities (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and
Rowan 1977; Scott 1987).  Both lines of research consider
three specific mechanisms or forces that engender consis-
tencies within or across organizations over time:  regulatory/
coercive forces, normative forces, and cognitive/mimetic
forces.  Regulatory or coercive mechanisms induce com-
pliance through an appeal to expediency; normative structures
appeal to agents’ social obligations, and cognitive or mimetic
structures operate through culturally taken-for-granted
meanings and ideologies (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott
1995).  Institutional theorists typically view these “institu-
tional pillars” as independent and alternate sources of
organizational structuring.
Paralleling the three institutional pillars, sociological theory
describes the foundational structures of institutions in terms
of domination, legitimation, and signification.  Structures of
domination are concerned with the operation of relations of
power; structures of legitimation are concerned with the
norms of behavior within a collective; structures of signifi-
cation are concerned with the communication of meaning
(Giddens 1979, pp. 81-82).  Rather than viewing domination,
legitimation, and signification as three independent modes of
institutionalization of organizational activity, sociologists
consider them to be inextricably intertwined in social practice.
The communication of meaning in interaction does
not take place separately from the operation of
relations of power, or outside the context of norma-
tive sanctions.  All social practices involve these
three elements…no social practice expresses, or can
be explicated in terms of, a single rule or type of
resource (Giddens 1979, pp. 81-82).
In this view of institutions as interdependent structures of
domination, legitimation, and signification, the institutiona-
lization of organizations is assumed and the focus of study is
on the disparate nature of institutions culminating from the
intersection of these three elements, rather than on the extent
to which they individually influence organizational agency
(Zucker 1987).  This idea of institutions as collections of
interdependent structures resonates with studies of strategic
groups and organizational configurations, where emergence
of distinct groups and configurations may be attributed to
concurrent enactments of strategic choices (e.g., Greenwood
and Hinings 1996; Lee et al. 2004).
The focus of this paper is on how different institutional
contexts, constituted through different configurations of
regulatory, normative, and cognitive structures, impact the
logic applied to the outsourcing decision.  Different insti-
tutional contexts have been noted to have implications for the
unfolding of economic activity and management of trans-
actions (e.g., Greif 1993, 1994; North 1990).  Thus, it is
meaningful to explore the application of economic logics
within alternate institutional contexts.  A dominant economic
logic in boundary decisions is transaction cost economics
(Ghoshal and Moran 1996).
Transaction Cost Economics
A transaction is a “unit of economic activity” that is located
within a “larger unit of economic activity,” such as the firm
(Commons 1990, p. 55).  A key tenet of TCE is that the logic
underlying economic decisions is that of cost-efficiency—of
minimization of production and transaction costs—and that
firms come into existence in order to obtain cost-efficiencies
precluded by markets.  Transaction costs are
ex ante costs of drafting, negotiating, and safe-
guarding an agreement and, more especially, the ex
post costs of maladaptation and adjustment that arise
when contract execution is misaligned as a result of
gaps, errors, omissions, and unanticipated distur-
bances (Williamson 1994, p. 103).
These transaction costs are constituted by two situational
conditions (i.e., asset specificity and uncertainty) and two
conditions of human frailty or beliefs about human behavior
(i.e., opportunism and bounded rationality) (Williamson 1975,
1985; also Pfeffer 1982).
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Asset specificity refers to the idiosyncratic nature of trans-
actions, “the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to
alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of
productive value” (Williamson 1996, p. 59).  Uncertainty
refers to the “computational inability to ascertain the structure
of the environment” (Williamson 1975, p. 23).  It is defined
in terms of knowledge about “the future state of the environ-
ment and what will be required to cope with that world”
(Pfeffer 1982, p. 135).  TCE assumes that decision makers are
prone to act with opportunism and that they display bounded
rationality in their decision making (Pfeffer 1982; Williamson
1975).  Opportunism is defined as “self-interest seeking with
guile, to include calculated efforts to mislead, deceive, obfus-
cate, and otherwise confuse” (Williamson 1994, p. 102).
Bounded rationality refers to “behavior that is intendedly
rational but only limitedly so” (Williamson 1975, p. 21).
Under conditions of bounded rationality, individuals are less
able “to receive, store, retrieve, and process information
without error” (Williamson 1975, p. 21).
The transaction costs constituted by these four conditions can
be mitigated by the frequency with which a transaction
occurs.  Frequency refers to “buyer activity in the market”
(Williamson 1985, p. 72)—the repetitiveness of a certain type
of transaction.  Recurrent transactions enable economies of
scale in regard to transaction costs:  “The cost of specialized
governance structures will be easier to recover for large
transactions of a recurring kind” (Williamson 1985, p. 60).  In
recurrent transactions, more information is revealed and the
ability of human decision makers to process that information
improves, thereby reducing transaction costs over time.  High
frequency transactions also facilitate efficiencies in produc-
tion costs as learning occurs via repetitive performance.  It is
important to note that with recurrent transactions, either
internal or external costs can be defrayed with increasing
transaction frequency.  As transactions get more asset-
specific, however, the likelihood of an external vendor being
able to afford lower production costs decreases because the
vendor is unable to harness economies of scale across
multiple clients (Williamson 1979).  Unlike situational and
human frailty conditions, then, increased frequency influences
the boundary decision as much through production as through
transaction costs.  Rather than dictating a particular boundary
decision, high transaction frequency simply defrays the
transaction costs associated with it.
Given the extensiveness of the diffusion of TCE-based logic,
it has come to hold the status of a normative theory, that is, a
theory of how boundary decisions should be made rather than
as a positive theory of how boundary decisions are made
(Ghoshal and Moran 1996).  Our treatment of TCE in this
analysis is as a normative theory.  Thus, our position is that
under conditions of asset specificity, uncertainty, anticipated
opportunism and bounded rationality, and low transaction
frequency, decision makers should internalize transactions.
In other words, we expect the economics of transaction costs
to be the operant rule or heuristic in boundary decisions.  This
approach allows us to then consider the extent to which
different institutions moderate the application of this highly
diffused economic rule.
Transaction Costs and Institutions
in Outsourcing Research
Several IS outsourcing researchers have modeled outsourcing
based on TCE.  They have either examined transaction costs
as a determinant of outsourcing expenditure or have focused
on the situational conditions giving rise to transaction costs.
These studies are summarized in Table 1.  Of particular
interest have been the issues of asset specificity and uncer-
tainty in discussions of IS outsourcing.  In addition to the
typical contracting problems that accrue from asset speci-
ficity, this condition is a further constraint in IS outsourcing
as it impinges on providers’ ability to leverage economies of
scale across multiple clients, and therefore limits the cost
efficiencies that can be transferred to the client (Aubert et al.
1996).  Asset-specific functions that are subject to higher
levels of uncertainty are outsourced less frequently (Aubert et
al. 1996).  Uncertainty (in terms of measurability2) was also
found to explain success in sourcing decisions in a manner
consistent with TCE, that is, organizations experienced fewer
problems when outsourcing functions low in uncertainty
(Aubert et al. 1996; Nam et al. 1996).
Nonetheless, contradictions and contingencies in the preva-
lence of the TCE logic are noted within and across studies,
indicating that TCE logic is incomplete in explaining out-
sourcing decisions.  For example, Ang and Cummings (1997)
found asset specificity to affect outsourcing in large but not
small banks.  They found uncertainty to have a positive, not
negative, effect on the decision to outsource.  No significant
effect of asset specificity on outsourcing was found in a
diverse sample of firms in North America (Nam et al. 1996).
Grover et al. (1996) found that while outsourcing functions
low in asset specificity had a positive effect on outsourcing
2Williamson (1985, 1996) also discusses measurement problems within the
measurement branch, which is less of a focus of TCE than is the governance
branch.  Within this branch, measurability constrains the distribution of
rewards that are commensurate with performance (Williamson 1985, pp. 80-
81).
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success, outsourcing functions high in asset specificity did not
have the anticipated negative impact on success.  Lacity and
Willcocks (1995) note several deviations from the logic of
asset specificity in firms’ outsourcing decisions; for example,
firms successfully insourced nonspecific assets or outsourced
such assets using tailored rather than generic contracts.  Ang
and Beath (1993, p. 330) observe that firms continue to out-
source asset-specific functions under conditions of uncertainty
so as to avail of providers’ “specialization or certain distinc-
tive competencies.”
Following the theory itself, TCE-based research on IS
outsourcing has tended to assume rather than study human
frailty conditions of opportunism and bounded rationality.  In
doing so, IS researchers have foregone the ability to com-
pletely leverage the explanatory potential of TCE.  In order
for TCE to be a theory, and not a self-fulfilling prophecy,
opportunism needs to be operationalized, not assumed
(Ghoshal and Moran 1996).  Similarly, Noorderhaven (1996)
criticized the assumption of bounded rationality as being
epistemologically simplistic, and suggests that TCE studies
investigate it empirically.  Studying, rather than assuming,
opportunism and bounded rationality may explain more of the
variance in outsourcing choices, thereby alleviating concerns
that TCE-based studies explain very little variance in the
outsourcing decision (Ang and Straub 1998; Clark et al.
1995).  Furthermore, understanding the contingencies posed
by the institutional context may shed additional light on the
outsourcing decision.
Research on IS outsourcing has considered the institutional
context, as summarized in Table 2.  Three trends are noted in
the institutional perspectives explicitly referenced in IS out-
sourcing research. First, studies that have explicitly con-
sidered institutional influences have considered the impact of
external pressures to outsource on internal decisions to
outsource (Ang and Cummings 1997; Loh and Venkatraman
1992; Lacity and Willcocks 1998).  Second, these external
pressures have been considered as structures that impact the
outsourcing decision independently of each other.  Third,
research has considered decision making as strategic inter-
ventions by organizational decision makers into their insti-
tutional environments (Ang and Cummings 1997).
In contrast to this previous research, the intent of this work is
the following.  First, we consider institutional structures
emanating from within the organization.  These structures are
regulatory or domination structures, normative or legitimation
structures, and cognitive or signification structures.  Second,
rather than viewing these structures as independent, we view
them as interdependent in constituting disparate institutional
contexts.  This approach is similar to that adopted by Lee et
al. (2004), describing organizational groups or configurations
based on their structuring patterns of outsourcing choices, and
work by Allen et al. (2002), considering the effect of internal
decision-making environments on outsourcing choices.
Third, the institutional contexts so described are independent
of the outsourcing phenomenon.  Finally, rather than viewing
decision making as strategic interventions into an institutional
context, this research takes the more basic position of insti-
tutions circumscribing decision making.  We now consider
the nature of the institutions underlying the city government
environments that are the focus of this study and how they
may be expected to circumscribe governments’ application of
the logic of TCE to the outsourcing decision.
The Institutional Contexts
of City Governments
Earlier, we noted that regulatory, normative, and cognitive
structures are inextricably intertwined in the constitution of
institutional contexts.  Critical theory (e.g., Habermas 1989)
and Weber’s (1978) contrasts of forms of authority provide
insight into the manner in which the three structures converge
in constituting alternate institutional contexts.  These theories
view coordinated action as culminating primarily from either
power or from shared meaning.  Structures of domination and
signification, therefore, vary in their levels of salience across
contexts.  The norms that operate in each of these contexts are
oriented primarily toward the communication of meaning or
toward the exercise of power.  Resulting institutional contexts
so constituted are professional or political.
In professional contexts, cognitive structures of procedural
knowledge are central to coordinated action (Satow 1975).
Regulation in its conventional sense is unnecessary, as uni-
formity is effected through consensus on values of procedural
rationality (Ritzer 1975; Satow 1975).  Normative structures
reference procedural rationality and focus on its diffusion
(Satow 1975).  In political contexts, regulation via political
authority is key to coordinated action (Weber 1978).  Unlike
the ideologically homogenized professional contexts, interests
and values can be diverse in political contexts (Satow 1975).
Cognitive structures play a weak role in these institutional
contexts since shared meaning is not essential to ordered
activity and is difficult to attain in the presence of varied
interests and values.  Normative structures legitimate the
exercise of authority by those vested with it (Weber 197).
While a level of procedural rationality may still appear in
such political contexts (Dean and Sharfman 1993), it is not
legitimated and its incidence is minimized with the increased
incidence of political behavior (Janis 1989).
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Cultural discontinuity from influx of new
ethnic groups enables diffusion of
professionalism
Demand for rationalization of tax structure
Increased urban population creates heightened
demand for public services within budgetary
constraints of cold-war era
New Deal policy enlarges scope of govern-
ment, requiring efficient management
Foundational demographic principle of 
separation of powers carries forward into
new century
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Figure 1.  Institutionalization of Professionalism and Deinstitutionalization of Politicism
Dichotomization of the Institutional
Contexts of City Governments
Historical events and social forces give rise to the patterning
of structures into distinct institutional contexts (e.g., Greif
1994).  Professional and political contexts are first visible in
the normative structures underlying mayor–council and
council–manager city governments respectively.  Initially, all
city governments were of the mayor–council form, which was
governed by the democratic principle of separation of powers.
A series of historical events provided the impetus for growing
professionalism and for resistance to that impetus.  These
events (summarized in Figure 1), and the variations with
which they impacted the different geographic areas of the
country, made for variations in the level of institutionalization
of the council–manager form and deinstitutionalization of the
mayor–council form.
In principle, procedural rationality is visible in council–
manager governments and political rationality in mayor–
council governments, engendering differences in organiza-
tional forms.  Mayor–council governments are associated with
a greater concern for outcomes such as societal contribution
and organizational history rather than for economic pragma-
tism (Hofstede et al. 1990).  Their focus on the separation of
powers exacerbates their plurality of values and multiplicity
of principals (Bertelli and Lynn 2003).  Division of power
also creates a climate of contention (Nunn 1996), fraught with
“dynamic tension, sniping and guerrilla warfare” (Svara 1990,
p. 53).  In regimes marked by multiple principals with
potentially competing interests and visions, incentives have a
weaker effect on behavior, and agents are often able to pursue
their own interests, without being strictly accountable to any
single principal (Bertelli and Lynn 2003; Dixit 1997;
Hölmstrom and Milgrom 1991).
Much like the private sector, a central tenet of the council–
manager form is economic pragmatism.  Its hallmark is the
professionally trained manager or chief administrative officer,
who is appointed by the city council (whose members are
elected by the public).  The mayor, who is also elected, has no
power beyond that of a council member, except for veto
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power in some instances (Svara 1990).  Instead, formal power
is held by the entire council, and often vested in the appointed
manager, whose professional training is expected to garner
the economic viability desired for the city.  This form of
government thus enables the operation of a singular, profes-
sional logic within a bureaucratic structure.  Decision makers
in these governments can operate on the basis of professional
principles, with little concern for political opposition and
conflict, as long as they operate rationally.  Reappointment of
managers is contingent on their ability to manage the city
government efficiently, within the constraints of the city
budget.  There is “no question about who has ultimate auth-
ority, and thus there are few battles to protect prerogatives”
(Svara 1990, p. 54).
Structural Analysis of Professional
and Political Institutions
The institutionalization of mayor–council and council–
manager city government forms has been imperfect, however,
with the traditional mayor–council structure being completely
abandoned in some cases and only partially deinstitu-
tionalized in others (Frederickson et al. 2004 Morgan and
Watson 1992; Protasel 1988).  Consequently, the norms
associated with the two different governmental forms map
imperfectly to cognition and regulatory practices (Frederick-
son et al. 2004).  Furthermore, normative structures may be
either supported or contradicted by regulatory or cognitive
structures (Giddens 1979).  Therefore, rather than viewing the
normative element of professional versus democratic values
as the sole distinguishing characteristic of city governments
and assuming a correspondence between the normative struc-
tures and cognitive and regulative structures, governmental
forms are considered in terms of all three structures.  The
interdependencies and intersections among these three struc-
tures yield the distinct professional and political institutional
contexts.
Normative Structures
Normative structures or structures of legitimation refer to the
guiding principles that prevail within a collective (Giddens
1979).  We have noted that the two forms of city government
differ in their underlying guiding principles.  Council–
manager city governments are normatively professional con-
texts, characterized by procedural rationality; mayor–council
governments are normatively democratic contexts, concerned
primarily with the balance of power (Svara 1990).  By not
only recognizing disparate interests across constituents, but
also anticipating and legitimating such disparities, mayor–
council governments engender contests among interests and
become politicized (Dean and Sharfman 1993).
Even a dominant norm, though, does not presume normative
consensus (Giddens 1979).  Discrepancies in individual mem-
bers’ subscription to norms engender differences in practices
among governments that are ostensibly council–manager or
mayor–council governments, and consequently in the degree
to which the city government is institutionalized and regula-
tory and cognitive structures support or contradict the
normative structures (Zucker 1987).
Regulatory Structures
The emergence of institutions is attributable also to the
manner in which power is enacted to regulate actors through
the allocation of material resources or authorization of human
resources (Giddens 1979; Scott 1995).  A critical distinction
in the enactment of power is the extent to which pluralistic
interests prevail in the disbursement of resources (Lukes
1974).  Accordingly, in the city government context, struc-
tures of domination are considered in terms of the pluralism
and contention among stakeholders in the deployment of
resources.  Routinization of contention with stakeholders is,
therefore, viewed as reflecting a patterning of relations of
power within the organization.
The incidence of competing interests and attention to man-
aging these interests in politicized institutions is high as there
is little consensus on means or ends and stakeholders with
disparate interests need to be co-opted toward necessary
collective action (e.g., Selznick 1957).  There is little profes-
sional autonomy in such contexts, and decision makers are
motivated to manage tensions so as to accomplish their own
interests (Moe 1987).  In contrast, in professional contexts,
since an objective standard of success is available, there is a
high degree of consensus on both means and ends, and
collective action emanates from this consensus (e.g., Tolbert
and Zucker 1983).  In other words, while professional norms
make overt regulation unnecessary within professional
contexts, political contexts are regulated via contention
among stakeholders, each articulating and defending their
respective interests.
Cognitive Structures
Cognitive structures or structures of signification are enacted
through interpretive schemes (Giddens 1979).  Such interpre-
tive schemes operate “as rules that constitute the nature of
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reality and the frames through which meaning is made” (Scott
1995, p. 40).  Central to such sensemaking in organizations
are organizational templates or strategic reference groups that
shape organizations’ awareness of relevant competencies and
response patterns (Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Powell
2000).  Strategic reference groups are inherently about
meaning as decision makers strive to make sense of who they
are vis-à-vis referent others (Labianca et al. 2001).  They have
been viewed as “cognitive communities” in which common
“mental models [are] used by key decision makers to interpret
the task environment of their organization” (Fiegenbaum and
Thomas 1995, pp. 462-463).  The extent to which organiza-
tions identify with strategic reference groups or perceive them
to be salient varies.  Thus, the salience of strategic reference
groups in decision making under uncertainty is a critical
reflection of the patterning of organizations’ cognition or
meaning systems (Bamberger and Fiegenbaum 1996).
The salience of strategic reference groups is inextricably
associated with the type of city government.  The political
nature of mayor–council structures makes them more attuned
to their political constituencies, who are able to supply votes
or other political commodities, rather than to strategic
reference groups in the conventional sense (Feiock et al.
2003).  In contrast, key decision makers in the professional
council–manager government are appointed and their tenure
is not tied to political cycles (Feiock et al. 2003).  In such
highly professionalized organizational fields, decision makers
are more attentive to strategic reference groups (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983).  Research has also noted that identification
with such groups increases with the prestige and attractive-
ness of the reference group and decreases with levels of intra-
organizational competition (Pratt 1998).  In professional con-
texts, the evident prestige and attractiveness of other govern-
ments that subscribe to similar norms is likely to engender
decision makers’ attentiveness to reference groups.  In con-
trast, in political contexts marked by competing positions
among stakeholders, attentiveness to external reference
groups is likely to be low.
Research Model and Hypotheses
Having delineated the institutional contexts of city govern-
ments, we now consider how these contexts moderate deci-
sion makers’ appropriation of the transaction cost heuristic to
outsourcing decisions.  Specifically, our position is that pro-
fessional institutional contexts will promote the application of
the TCE heuristic but that political contexts will tend to
suppress the application of such logic in outsourcing deci-
sions.  This model is summarized in Figure 2.  We now
examine the specific ways in which the institutional contexts
of city governments circumscribe the application of TCE
logic to the outsourcing decision.
Asset Specificity
Because asset specificity engenders an ex post small numbers
condition, TCE predicts that higher levels of asset specificity
make clients vulnerable to potential provider malfeasance,
and therefore lead to the internalization of the transaction.  In
addition to the logic advanced by Williamson, there is a
second reason why asset specificity typically raises trans-
action costs.  Asset-specific functions are likely to represent
an organization’s core competence:  The core or distinctive
competence of a firm is based on it making distinctive use of
its resources (Penrose 1995).  Thus, a core competence is
specific to an organization.  As such, nondelivery of services
related to the asset-specific functions can be detrimental to the
client.  Outsourcing is thus likely to be viewed as risky by
decision makers employing a procedural rationality.  In the IS
outsourcing arena, research has supported this position:
transaction asset specificity has been found to reduce the
incidence of outsourcing (e.g., Poppo and Zenger 1998; Ang
and Cummings 1997).
The logic underlying organizational design choices (e.g.,
conditions under which transactions are internalized or
externalized) diffuses within institutional fields (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983).  The extent to which organizations are
receptive to such influence emanating from their field is a
function of their level of professionalism (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983).  Thus, cognition in professional governments
is likely to be shaped by external reference groups, in
particular their public sector counterparts and other profes-
sional governments, who believe in internalizing asset-
specific functions.  In fact, increasing professionalization of
governments has been noted to result in increasing internali-
zation of asset-specific functions (Clingermayer and Feiock
1997).  This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a:  Higher levels of asset specificity will
lead to a lower proportion of the IS budget being
outsourced in professional contexts.
As noted earlier, political governments are not particularly
attentive to strategic reference groups in their sensemaking.
The TCE logic that is taken-for-granted within the private
sector (Ghoshal et al. 1999) is therefore unlikely to have
diffused extensively within such governments.  The political
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Figure 2.  Research Model
context is also unlikely to subscribe to the efficiency-based
value of knowledge specialization (Williamson 1999), and
therefore to committing resources to internally staffing an IT
function with expertise with potentially limited or short-term
applicability (Barthelemy 2001).  Instead, the pluralism
inherent in this form of government is likely to lead to
outsourcing of asset-specific functions.  In contrast to lower
organizational importance of commodity functions, an asset-
specific function’s proximity to an organization’s core
competence makes it salient and visible.  Being responsible
for under-performance with regard to these functions, even in
the short-run, can be politically costly.  In contrast, exter-
nalizing asset-specific functions offers political contenders the
opportunity to take credit for strong performance, when the
vendor is able to deliver, and plausible deniability should the
vendor not perform (Clark et al. 1995).  Thus, we hypothesize
Hypothesis 1b:  Higher levels of asset specificity will
lead to a higher proportion of the IS budget being
outsourced in political contexts.
Uncertainty
As per TCE, conditions of uncertainty surrounding the trans-
action preclude complete contracting and dictate hierarchical
control.  In the context of IS outsourcing, the most salient
aspect of uncertainty is technological change and the
complexity of technology.  Because of this, managers in both
the public and private sector have a limited ability to foresee
technological developments and problems.  This makes it
more difficult to write a contract that covers all exigencies,
and internalization of transactions is therefore prescribed
(Williamson 1985).
Diffusion of the TCE logic within the professional context
will encourage adherence to the prescription of insourcing
under conditions of uncertainty (Ghoshal et al. 1999).  Addi-
tionally, given the norm of economic pragmatism governing
decision making in professional contexts, the heightened
governance costs associated with conditions of uncertainty
(Williamson 1985) are likely to dissuade outsourcing.
Therefore, we hypothesize
Hypothesis 2a:  Higher levels of uncertainty
experienced will lead to a lower proportion of the IS
budget being outsourced in professional contexts.
Decision makers in political contexts will lack awareness of
the prescription to insource under conditions of uncertainty.
Since efficiency is not the central concern in these contexts,
minimizing governance costs will not be a priority.  Instead,
the regulatory context, marked by contention among key
decision makers, will prompt those responsible for the IS
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function to offset the potential liabilities of uncertainty by
outsourcing (Nunn 1996; Svara 1990).  Outsourcing diverts
accountability in case of vendor failure (Clark et al. 1995).  In
the face of the pluralistic interests and contentiousness under-
lying these governments, the ability to externalize key acti-
vities has been found to be desirable:  “Politicians delegate
authority to avoid the political fallout from controversial
decisions” (Clingermayer and Feiock 1997, p. 235).  We
therefore propose
Hypothesis 2b:  Higher levels of uncertainty experi-
enced will lead to a higher proportion of the IS
budget being outsourced in political contexts.
Opportunism
TCE assumes that external agents will act opportunistically,
raising transaction costs in market relations.  In order to
minimize the transaction costs that ensue from opportunistic
behavior, TCE prescribes that managers should maintain
hierarchical control of transactions that may be susceptible to
opportunism (i.e., such transactions should be insourced).
Management by fiat (i.e., authoritative control) is an
important governance advantage of hierarchies (Williamson
1975).  Given a norm of professionalism, decision makers in
professional contexts can view themselves as managers and
their employees as subordinates in a bureaucratic structure,
and avail themselves of such fiat (Clingermayer and Feiock
1997; Satow 1975).  In this form, managers are also able to
provide employees with low-powered bureaucratic rewards,
which have been found to be effective in curtailing oppor-
tunism (Feiock et al. 2003).  Again, the TCE-based logic
dictating avoidance of opportunism through insourcing is
likely to have diffused to these professionally trained and
managed organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  Within
such a context, as predicted by TCE, concerns about potential
opportunism by a vendor will prompt insourcing and the
subjection of employees to managerial fiat to curb potential
opportunism.  We therefore propose:
Hypothesis 3a:  Higher levels of opportunism
experienced will lead to a lower proportion of the IS
budget being outsourced in professional contexts.
In contrast, in the absence of professional efficiency-based
norms and reference groups that are familiar with the TCE
logic, avoidance of opportunism through insourcing is
unlikely to be a robust logic in politically managed contexts.
Furthermore, the pluralism of strong mayor–council structures
will tend to undermine managerial fiat.  A multiplicity of
principals precludes the successful application of managerial
fiat as employees can selectively respond to principals or play
them off each other (Dixit 1997).  Instead of low-powered
bureaucratic rewards, this institutional context is conducive
only to the application of high-powered political rewards,
which have not been found to be effective in curbing
opportunism (Feiock et al. 2003).  Concerns about vulnera-
bility to opportunism cannot be resolved by internalizing the
transaction.  Instead, decision makers may perceive them-
selves to be less vulnerable to an external vendor, whose
opportunism can be controlled, albeit incompletely, by terms
specified within a contract.  The contract also minimizes
principals’ exposure to each other’s opportunism because they
too are bound by the terms of the contract.  Hence, we offer
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3b:  Higher levels of opportunism
experienced will lead to a higher proportion of the
IS budget being outsourced in political contexts.
Bounded Rationality
TCE assumes that internal actors are boundedly rational, and
that this limits their ability to completely anticipate even-
tualities, thereby constraining decision makers’ ability to
completely stipulate contract terms.  In translating bounded
rationality from an assumption to a focal construct in the
theory, we consider bounded rationality in terms of the
absence of adequate information systems capabilities.  This
creates conditions of bounded rationality in two ways.  First,
inadequate information systems capabilities constrain decision
makers’ information processing capabilities (Galbraith 1973).
Not only do information systems provide decision makers
with access to organizational information that enables them to
anticipate organizations’ technological needs and require-
ments, it also helps them manage and process the information
so that it can be applied more easily to making contractual
decisions (Williamson 1985).  Second, inadequate informa-
tion systems capabilities cause decision makers to undervalue
additional technological investments during the sourcing
decision (Madhok 1996).  This lowers the price that they are
willing to pay for fulfillment.  The unavailability of founda-
tional information systems capabilities that results in under-
valuing of services also engenders suspicion of vendors who
price their services higher than anticipated, thereby increasing
transaction costs (Williamson 1985).  Normatively, TCE
prescribes that decision makers insource transactions under
conditions of bounded rationality because they are unable to
completely specify a viable contract (Williamson 1985).  In
professional contexts governed by economic success prin-
ciples, unrealistic value perceptions and increased transaction
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costs will thus preclude outsourcing under conditions of
bounded rationality.  We therefore predict
Hypothesis 4a:  Higher levels of bounded rationality
will lead to a lower proportion of the IS budget
being outsourced in professional contexts.
The absence of complementary capabilities is unlikely to be
associated with similar restraint in a political context, which
is not governed by norms of efficiency.  Furthermore, in
regimes marked by the presence of multiple principals with
potentially competing interests, agents are able to pursue their
own interests, without being strictly accountable to any
individual principal (Bertelli and Lynn 2003; Dixit 1997;
Hölmstrom and Milgrom 1991).  Since limited information
systems capabilities curtail principals’ information processing
about each other’s activities (Williamson 1985), conditions of
bounded rationality are likely to engender an experience of
vulnerability among decision makers in pluralistic contexts as
decision makers are unable to process information about their
political contenders within the organization.  Information
processing capabilities can provide intelligence about political
contenders.  Control of information systems is, therefore,
likely to equate to political control.  Under conditions of
bounded rationality, decision makers are unlikely to relin-
quish control of information processing capabilities to any
single principal.  Outsourcing these capabilities helps ensure
that no single principal has information processing advantages
over another.  In political contexts, we propose
Hypothesis 4b:  Higher levels of bounded rationality
will lead to a higher proportion of the IS budget
being outsourced in political contexts.
Frequency
Earlier we noted that the frequency with which a transaction
occurs—or is expected to occur –mitigates transaction costs.
Transactions that have occurred frequently in the past enable
the client to write a more complete contract; those likely to
occur frequently in the future enable the client to write-off
contracting costs, including transaction costs, over more
transactions (Williamson 1985).
In professional contexts, frequency should thus mitigate
transaction costs, resulting in a higher proportion of the IS
budget being allocated toward outsourcing.  In IS functions
that have been utilized more often, key IS decision makers are
more likely to have the requisite knowledge to adequately
stipulate contract terms, thereby minimizing the cost of trans-
acting.  From a purely transaction cost perspective, recurrent
transactions can provide contracting economies of scale.
Hypothesis 5a:  Higher transactional frequency will
lead to a higher proportion of the IS budget being
outsourced in professional contexts.
However, this effect will not hold for political contexts.  Due
to their pluralistic nature, IT decision makers in these contexts
will have to contend with elected officials, who are likely to
view the outsourcing and concurrent job loss of a frequently
used function to be a greater political liability than a less
frequently used function (Kim 2003).  Outsourcing of func-
tions that are used more frequently will likely be more visible
to the public, and therefore likely to be perceived as poli-
tically more hazardous, representing a threat to politicians’
reelection.  We hypothesize
Hypothesis 5b:  Higher transactional frequency will
lead to a lower proportion of the IS budget being
outsourced in political contexts.
Research Methods
The respondents for this survey were IS managers in city
governments within the United States.  IS managers were
selected because, based on initial interviews with city
managers, they were noted to be the individuals principally
responsible for the IS function and for implementing IS out-
sourcing decisions.  As such, they are the most knowl-
edgeable about circumstances surrounding the IS function, IS
outsourcing vendors, and the extent of outsourcing in their
organizations.  Such a use of key informants is considered a
viable strategy in survey research (Huber and Power 1985).
The instrument was mailed to 800 IS managers in city govern-
ments nationwide.  The key decision makers responsible for
the IS function were identified from Carroll’s Municipal
Directory (1997/1998) as potential respondents.  The sample
was stratified based on the population being served by the
government and the type of government, with the surveys
being divided equally among small, medium, and large cities
and council–manager and mayor–council types of city
governments.  Survey participation was encouraged through
phone calls, a repeat mailing, and a fax.  A total of 232
responses (29 percent) were collected.  Of the surveys
returned, 214 were usable:  124 (57.9 percent) from council–
manager type governments and 90 (42.1 percent) from
mayor–council type governments.
The Institutional Context
The institutional contexts underlying city governments in the
data set are identified as follows.  First, the nature of the three
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institutional structures—normative, regulatory, and cogni-
tive—in each government was ascertained.  Notably, institu-
tionalization typically lends itself only to indirect assessment
due to its taken-for-granted nature(Zucker 1987). To ascertain
their institutional context, governments were subjected to a
cluster analysis of their normative, cognitive, and regulatory
structuring to ascertain their underlying institutional
patterning.  These procedures are now detailed.
Earlier, we noted that regulatory structures were reflected in
the level of pluralism and contention within city governments.
This was assessed using three self-report, seven-point Likert
scale items, presented in Table 3.  Cognitive structures were
operationalized as the salience of strategic reference groups
in decision making under uncertainty (Bamberger and
Fiegenbaum 1996).   The two 7-point Likert items used to
assess the reliance on strategic reference groups are presented
in Table 3.  The first of these speaks directly to other govern-
ments as reference groups; the second considers conferences
and professional meetings as venues through which city
governments can obtain information about referent govern-
ments.  Finally, differences in normative structures or struc-
tures of legitimation are evident in differences in the
mayor–council or council–manager form of city governments.
Cities were classified as mayor–council or council–manager
types based on categorization provided by an ICMA publi-
cation (International City/County Association 1997).
An exploratory factor analysis of the institutional structures
was conducted to confirm the discriminant validity of each
structure.  The initial factor analysis, using an extraction
criterion of a minimum initial eigenvalue of 1, yielded two
factors.  However, the highest loading of government form
(cognitive structuring) on this solution was less than 0.50 (i.e.,
–.474)  An alternate factor structure, using an extraction
criterion of three factors, was therefore explored.  The factor
loadings from this three-factor solution, with a Promax
(oblique) rotation, are reported in Table 3.3
In order to ascertain the institutional context of each
responding government, we subjected the data to a cluster
analysis of the normative, regulatory, and cognitive structures.
This cluster analysis identified distinct government clusters
based on these institutional structures.  We adopted a two-
stage clustering process, as recommended by Ketchen and
Shook (1996) and Hair et al. (1998).  First, we subjected the
three institutional structures to a hierarchical cluster analysis,
utilizing Ward’s method, which tends to produce roughly
equally sized clusters by minimizing within-group variation
(Hair et al. 1998).  Rather than relying on a visual scan of the
resulting dendrogram, the agglomeration schedule was
consulted to determine the stage at which there was a large
distance between clusters combined.  Based on the change in
the agglomeration index, a two-cluster solution was deemed
to be the most descriptive of the data (Hair et al. 1998).  
This two-cluster solution confirmed our expectations of the
existence of two types of institutional contexts.  Once this
solution was obtained and our theory confirmed, we ascer-
tained the cluster centers based on this method and used them
to seed a second k-means cluster analysis.  The advantage of
this nonhierarchical method is that it is less vulnerable to
outlying data and, as an iterative method, optimizes within-
cluster homogeneity and between-cluster heterogeneity
(Ketchen and Shook 1996).  Seeding the analysis with the
initial cluster centers obtained from the hierarchical cluster
analysis counteracts the tendency of the iterative method to
converge on a locally optimal solution (Hair et al. 1998).
Such a combination of hierarchical and nonhierarchical
approaches is thus believed to produce optimal solutions (Hair
et al. 1998; Ketchen and Shook 1996).  The initial and final
cluster centers are provided in Table 4.
The cluster was used as an indicator of each government’s
institutional context (i.e., as a moderator in the analysis of the
effects of TCE constructs on outsourcing).  The k-means
method also produces an assessment of each case’s distance
from the cluster center.  This distance from the cluster center
was used as an indicator of the extent of institutionalization of
a particular city government.  This statistic was then used as
a control variable in the analysis, allowing us to account for
cluster outliers or the effects of weak institutionalization.
As anticipated, the normative structure was not the defining
attribute of the two institutional contexts.  In the professional
cluster, 72 of the 98 city governments (74 percent) were
council–manager governments.  Of the remaining 26 that
were mayor–council governments, the majority (14 or 14.3
percent) were small cities with populations of 25,000 or less.
Thus, small cities with a mayor–council structure often as-
sumed the norms of professionalism.  In the political cluster,
63 of the 115 city governments (55 percent) were mayor-type
governments, and 52 of them (45 percent) were council–
manager city governments, suggesting that norms of profes-
sionalism have imperfectly diffused through these govern-
ments or are being resisted (Frederickson et al. 2004).
3Note that the initial eigenvalue for the third factor of this solution was 0.918,
with the final eigenvalue exceeding 1.0.  In order to further confirm the
appropriateness of this three-factor solution, a four-factor solution was also
inspected.  The fourth factor was noted to have an initial eigenvalue of 0.644,
with the variance of strategic reference groups (signification) being dis-
tributed across factors 3 and 4.  The three-factor solution was therefore
retained.
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Table 3.  Factor Analysis of Institutional Structures
Items
Regulatory
Structures
Cognitive
Structures
Normative
Structures
Pluralism
We face opposition from elected officials 0.784 -0.037 0.097
We face opposition from employees 0.898 0.042 -0.083
We face opposition from department heads 0.911 -0.009 0.009
Strategic Reference Groups
Under conditions of uncertainty, our department investigates
other governments’ IS decisions
-0.042 0.847 0.108
Under conditions of uncertainty, we attend conferences or
professional meetings on IS management
0.042 0.797 -0.107
Organizational Form
Council–manager or mayor–council forms 0.014 0.007 0.988
Initial eigenvalues 2.329 1.382 0.918
Final eigenvalues 2.285 1.414 1.080
Reliability (Cronbach’s ") 0.832 0.738 NA
Table 4.  Institutional Clustering of Regulatory, Cognitive, and Normative Structures
Structures
Initial Centers* Final Centers
Professional
Cluster Political Cluster
Professional
Cluster Political Cluster
Regulatory Structures
(Pluralistic Interests)
-0.0308
(0.9212)
0.0390
(1.0954)
-0.4391
(0.9404)
0.3742
(0.8945)
Cognitive Structures
(Strategic Reference Groups)
0.2083
(0.8527)
-0.2811
(1.0970)
0.7793
(0.5936)
-0.6784
(0.7475)
Normative Structures
(Government Form)
Manager
(100%)
Mayor
(100%)
Manager
(74%)
Mayor
(55%)
Number 119 94 98 115
*Means for continuous variables, predominant category for discrete variable (Standard deviation for continuous variables, proportions for discrete
variable)
Measures
Below, we provide a description of our dependent variable,
the independent variables, the institutional moderator, and the
control variables used in this study.
IS Outsourcing Expenditure (Dependent Variable)
The instructions for assessing IS outsourcing expenditure
were:  “The questions below concern IS expenditures in your
city government.  Please give the percentage of the total IS
budget that is allocated in-house or outsourced for each IS
function.”  Respondents indicated the proportion of the total
IS budget allocated to each of five IS functions—data pro-
cessing, network/telecommunications, application develop-
ment/maintenance, end-user support, and systems planning/
management—and then the proportion of each function
outsourced.  This enabled us to calculate the overall propor-
tion of the IS function outsourced, which served as the
dependent variable.  Note that the composite metric for the
proportion of IS budget outsourced excludes the nondiscre-
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tionary sourcing of the data processing function.  As a low-
skill, low-salaried function, there is considerable pressure on
city governments to retain this function in-house (Kim 2003).
This metric therefore represents the proportion of the discre-
tionary IS budget outsourced.
TCE Constructs (Independent Variables)
Since scales assessing the TCE constructs within the context
of IS outsourcing were not available at the time this study was
designed, scales were developed for the purpose.  In devel-
oping these scales, efforts were made to select scale items
consistent with the theory.  To this end, TCE literature was
reviewed extensively and items constructed to represent the
core TCE constructs.  Respondents answered each of these
perceptual, self-report items on a seven-point Likert scale.
The resulting survey instrument was vetted in interviews with
six IS managers in the south Florida area.  It was subsequently
pretested on these six IS managers and piloted in 240 city
governments in Florida.  
Items from the survey instrument used to assess TCE con-
structs are summarized in Table 5 along with their psycho-
metric properties.  This is based on an exploratory factor
analysis, with an extraction criterion specifying a minimum
eigenvalue of 1 and an oblique rotation, which reveals the true
underlying factor pattern rather than a solution that enforces
orthogonality, and is therefore considered the appropriate
approach for demonstrating discriminant validity (Ford et al.
1986).
Institutional Context (Moderator)
Following the cluster analysis reported on above, each city
government was classified as professional or political, based
on its cluster membership.
Control Variables
Three control variables were used in this study:  organiza-
tional size, IS budget, and extent of institutionalization.
Organizational size was considered in terms of the population
served by the city government.  Population figures were ob-
tained from an ICMA publication (International City/County
Association 1997).  The IS budget was assessed on the survey
instrument using the following question:  What percentage of
the total city budget do you allocate for IS expenditures?  The
extent of institutionalization was operationalized during the
cluster analysis as the distance of a city government from its
respective cluster center.  City governments close to the
cluster center reflect congruence with the archetypical institu-
tional context in the patterning of the structures and therefore
stronger levels of institutionalization; observations further
away from the center reflect patterns that are less consistent
with the archetypical institution, and therefore lower levels of
institutionalization (Venkatraman 1989; Zucker 1987).
Sample Characteristics
Respondent characteristics are summarized in Table 6.  There
was an insignificant difference in the distribution of
organization size across the professional and political clusters
(p(P2) = 0.45).  The authorization differences were marginally
significant with respect to both spending limits (t = 3.46, p =
0.065) and distance from the approval authority (t = 2.85, p =
0.093).
Assessing Nonrepsonse Bias
Two assessments of nonrepsonse bias were conducted.  The
first compared early versus late respondents separating the
178 responses received in the first round of the survey from
the 36 responses received subsequently.  These two sets of
respondents were compared with respect to their IT budget
(assessed as the proportion of the total city budget allocated
to IT), and the outsourcing budget (assessed as the proportion
of the total IT budget allocated to IT outsourcing).  They were
not found to differ significantly with regard to either their IT
budget (t = 0.833, p = 0.406) or outsourcing budget (t = 0.643,
p = 0.521).
The second analysis for nonrespondent bias compared the
sample of responding cities (n = 214) with a comparable
sample of nonresponding cities (n = 230) with regard to city
population and the total city expenditure.  The population of
responding and nonresponding cities was not found to be
significantly different (t = 0.842, p = 0.400).  Population
statistics were available for all cities, but total city expen-
ditures were available only for cities with populations over
25,000.  Therefore, this test for nonrespondent bias contrasted
all respondents and nonrespondents with regard to population,
but only respondents and nonrespondents in cities with popu-
lations over 25,000 with regard to cities’ total expenditure
(excluding small cities).  The differences in expenditure were
not found to be significantly different across respondents and
nonrespondents (t = 0.818, p = 0.433).
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Table 5.  Factor Analysis of TCE Constructs
Items AS UN OP BR FR
Our IS function requires unique experience 0.812 -0.189 -0.030 -0.234 0.046
Our IS function requires up-to-date technical
education.
0.684 0.210 0.048 0.024 0.093
Our IS function requires a unique technology. 0.825 0.209 0.018 0.100 0.036
We need to control IS expenses. -0.074 0.784 0.000 -0.145 -0.002
It is difficult to foresee and keep up with the
development changes in IS technologies.
0.270 0.751 0.023 -0.002 -0.009
We would like to anticipate the obsolescence of IS
functions in the organization.
0.030 0.795 -0.014 -0.052 0.069
When we outsource, we are concerned about
losing control of strategic applications.
-0.052 0.059 0.816 0.080 0.065
When we outsource, we are concerned about being
locked into the contract.
0.008 -0.153 0.864 -0.178 -0.023
When we outsource, we are concerned about
added costs for business or technology changes.
0.108 0.015 0.793 -0.046 0.003
When we outsource, we are concerned about the
inability to rebuild IS functions in our organization.
-0.048 0.059 0.798 0.120 -0.049
We have limited physical facilities in the
organization.
-0.120 0.168 0.025 -0.844 0.087
We have limited expertise in the organization. 0.350 0.004 -0.081 -0.653 0.027
We do not have necessary facilities in our
organization.
0.047 0.082 0.042 -0.843 0.049
We use the IS function infrequently -0.006 -0.002 0.005 0.001 0.951
We need the IS function temporarily 0.007 -0.027 -0.007 -0.003 0.951
Scale Reliability (Cronbach’s ") 0.806 0.802 0.835 0.856 0.887
AS = Asset Specificity; UN = Uncertainty; OP = Opportunism; BR = Bounded Rationality; FR = Frequency
Table 6.  Overview of Sample
Sample Characteristics
Professional
Contexts
Political
Contexts Total
Organizational Characteristics:  Population*
Small (below 25,000) 38 (38.8%) 46 (40.0%) 84 (39.3%)
Medium (between 25,000-50,000) 28 (28.6%) 31 (27.0%) 59 (27.6%)
Large (over 50,000) 22 (32.7%) 38 (33.0%) 71 (33.2%)
Respondent Characteristics:  Authority+
Maximum dollar value authorized to spend for IS outsourcing
without requiring approval from upper management
8,850.65
(12,608.35)
34,395.28
(221,568.50)
22,024.61
(159,399.50)
Levels of the hierarchy between your position as IS director
and that of the director from whom you need to get
[budgetary] approval
1.28
(0.62)
1.36
(0.87)
1.32
(0.75)
Total 98 (46.0%) 115 (54.0%) 213 (100%)
*Frequencies (proportion of sample); +Sample means (standard deviation)
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Table 7.  Descriptive Statistics
Variable Professional Context
Political
Context Total
Population (Size – in 1000s) 55.39 (73.76) 59.36 (122.57) 57.31 (102.82)
IS budget (as percent of city budget) 3.41 (5.79) 4.71 (8.36) 4.11 (7.31)
Extent of institutionalization 1.04 (0.51) 1.10 (0.47) 1.07 (0.49)
Percentage of IS budget outsourced 27.77 (24.60) 22.83 (23.43) 25.11 (24.04)
Asset specificity 5.22 (1.46) 4.89 (1.39) 5.04 (1.43)
Uncertainty 4.90 (1.42) 4.37 (1.16) 4.62 (1.31)
Opportunism 4.38 (1.44) 4.56 (1.17) 4.48 (1.30)
Bounded rationality 5.44 (1.36) 4.76 (1.35) 5.07 (1.39)
Frequency 5.20 (1.54) 4.35 (1.60) 4.74 (1.62)
Table 8.  Bivariate Correlations among Constructs
Constructs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Institutional context
2. Extent of institutionalization 0.059
3. Population (Size) 0.019 0.090
4. IS budget 0.089 -0.073 -0.103
5. Percentage of  IS budget
outsourced
-0.103 0.023 -0.080 -0.126
6. Asset Specificity -0.118 -0.002 -0.038 -0.016 0.285*
7. Uncertainty -0.202* 0.029 0.055 0.036 0.244* 0.541*
8. Bounded Rationality -0.246* 0.004 -0.088 -0.035 0.302* 0.554* 0.502*
9. Opportunism 0.069 -0.074 -0.099 0.072 -0.202* 0.031 0.083  0.025
10. Frequency -0.264* 0.044 0.023 -0.136+ 0.212* 0.423* 0.372* 0.497* 0.004
*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; +Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Analysis and Results
Descriptive statistics for study variables are presented in
Table 7.  Means and standard deviations are presented for
each institutional context, as well as for the overall sample.
Bivariate correlations among variables are provided in
Table 8.
Treatment of Missing Data
Data for 40 of the total 214 observations were missing for the
IS budget variable.  Since this represented a relatively high
proportion of the data (i.e., 18.7 percent), the missing data for
this control variable were replaced with the average budget
estimate for the population strata.  Using the population strata
as a basis for the averages made sense since population served
as the basis for the stratified sample.  Replacement with the
mean is a relatively conservative technique for handling
missing data since it does not artificially elevate or deflate the
parameter estimate.  The alternate technique of case-wise
deletion would have resulted in a loss of data that was
especially unnecessary since the missing data concerned only
a control variable and not a variable involved in any of the
hypothesis.  No adjustments were required for any other
variables as a very small proportion of the data were missing,
enabling over 96 percent to be retained for analysis.
Miranda & Kim/Transaction Cost Heuristics in IS Outsourcing
744 MIS Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 3/September 2006
Table 9.  Results of Hierarchical Regression
Term
1:  Controls
2:  Institutional
Effect 3:  TCE Effects
4:  Constrained
Rationality
F p F p F p F p
Intercept 39.95 0.000 39.95 0.000 42.19 0.000 45.73 0.000
Population (Size) 1.30 0.255 1.21 0.273 0.62 0.434 0.21 0.651
IS Budget 3.56 0.059 3.22 0.074 3.29 0.071 4.02 0.046
Extent of Institutionalization 0.01 0.942 0.00 0.952 0.01 0.909 0.05 0.819
Institutional Context 1.07 0.302 0.61 0.437 1.47 0.227
Asset specificity 5.97 0.015 9.60 0.002
Uncertainty 5.22 0.023 7.89 0.006
Opportunism 4.51 0.035 2.81 0.095
Bounded Rationality 3.09 0.080 1.42 0.234
Frequency 0.18 0.670 0.72 0.397
Institutional Context*AS 0.47 0.492
Institutional Context*U 2.99 0.086
Institutional Context*OP 7.02 0.009
Institutional Context*BR 10.69 0.001
Institutional Context*FR 6.01 0.015
R2 0.022 0.215 0.028 0.237 0.221 0.000 0.305 0.000
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.008 0.184 0.252
)R2 0.006 0.259 0.193 0.000 0.084 0.003
Results of Hierarchical Regression
To analyze the predicted moderation of TCE logic by the
institutional context, a moderated regression was conducted.
The analysis was conducted using the GLM procedure in
SPSS.  To minimize the multicollinearity problems possible
with the interaction terms, the TCE and institutional context
variables were centered (Aiken and West 1991).
Results of the regression are presented in Table 9.  These
results suggest that a main effect existed for asset specificity,
that uncertainty had no significant impact on outsourcing
levels, and that the effects of opportunism, bounded
rationality, and frequency were indeed moderated by the
institutional context.  Terms in the final model that are signi-
ficant at " = 0.05 are highlighted.
The GLM procedure allows for concurrent estimates of
parameter coefficients for different levels of a dummy
variable, along with their levels of significance.  Since sub-
sample estimates are computed with a loss of power (Stone
and Hollenbeck 1989), to obtain the parameter coefficients for
the subsamples, the model was rerun, including the interaction
terms only for the TCE constructs noted to be significantly
moderated by the institutional context in Table 9.  To further
account for the loss of power in the subsample analysis, the
decision criteria for rejection of the null hypothesis was
relaxed to " = 0.10.  Resulting sample and subsample $s and
their significance levels from this analysis are depicted in
Table 10.
Discussion
The results presented in Tables 9 and 10 clearly indicate
support for institutional mitigation of the logic of TCE.  We
now consider the implications of our findings for theory and
IS practice.  In order to facilitate this discussion, the results of
hypothesis testing are summarized in Table 11.
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Table 10.  Sample $s (and p-values) for Main Effects and Subsample $s (and p-values)
Term
Main
Effects 
Subsample Effects
Professional Political 
Sample/Subsample $s (and p-values)
Population 0.00 (0.635) – –
IS Budget -0.38 (0.056) – –
Institutional Context* -3.60 (0.252) – –
Institutionalization -0.03 (0.991) – –
Asset specificity 5.93 (0.004) – –
Uncertainty 5.61 (0.005) – –
Opportunism – -6.70 (0.002) 1.58 (0.502)
Bounded Rationality – -1.60 (0.558) 6.44 (0.012)
Frequency – 5.86 (0.030) -3.93 (0.096)
*1 = Professional, 0 = Political 
Table 11.  Results of Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis Finding
1a Higher levels of asset specificity will lead to a lower proportion of the IS budget being outsourced in
professional contexts.
Reversed
1b Higher levels of asset specificity will lead to a higher proportion of the IS budget being outsourced
in political contexts.
Supported
2a Higher levels of uncertainty experienced will lead to a lower proportion of the IS budget being
outsourced in professional contexts.
Reversed
2b Higher levels of uncertainty experienced will lead to a higher proportion of the IS budget being
outsourced in political contexts.
Supported
3a Higher levels of opportunism experienced will lead to a lower proportion of the IS budget being
outsourced in professional contexts.
Supported
3b Higher levels of opportunism experienced will lead to a higher proportion of the IS budget being
outsourced in political contexts.
Not supported
4a Higher levels of bounded rationality will lead to a lower proportion of the IS budget being
outsourced in professional contexts.
Not supported
4b Higher levels of bounded rationality will lead to a higher proportion of the IS budget being
outsourced in political contexts.
Supported
5a Higher transactional frequency will lead to a higher proportion of the IS budget being outsourced in
professional contexts.
Supported
5b Higher transactional frequency will lead to a lower proportion of the IS budget being outsourced in
political contexts.
Supported
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Institutional Moderation of the Logic of TCE
In this paper, we viewed TCE as a heuristic that is applied to
boundary decisions, specifically to IS outsourcing.  We then
posited that different institutional contexts would either
support or contradict the application of this heuristic.  Our
findings provide partial support for these premises.
First, we note that the TCE heuristic is not one that is blindly
applied to the outsourcing decision, as might be believed
following critiques of TCE by Ghoshal and colleagues.  In
fact, outsourcing choices were found to directly contravene
this heuristic vis-à-vis asset specificity and uncertainty.
Second, it is evident that understanding the institutional
context does matter.  Interestingly, though, the institutional
context appears more important in moderating the effects of
human frailty conditions (i.e., opportunism and bounded
rationality) and of frequency, than of fundamental situational
conditions (i.e., asset specificity and uncertainty).  This
finding is consistent with the notion that institutions come into
existence so as to influence decision makers’ perceptions and
expectations surrounding a transaction, rather than the attri-
butes of the transaction itself (e.g., North 1990).  The institu-
tional context also significantly moderated the effect of
transaction frequency on outsourcing.  We now consider each
component of the TCE heuristic and its intersection with the
institutional context.
Asset Specificity
Our results indicate that regardless of the institutional context,
asset specificity had a positive effect on outsourcing.  This is
clearly a contradiction of the TCE heuristic.  To understand
why governments would outsource functions high in asset
specificity but not those low in asset specificity (why there
would be a positive relationship between asset specificity and
outsourcing), we need to consider the resource context of the
public sector compared to the private sector.  The relative
munificence plays a salient role in mitigating the effects of
TCE constructs on boundary decisions (Steensma and Corley
2001).  Analyses of the dynamics of internal labor markets
suggest that resource munificence impacts organizations’
ability to internalize asset-specific skills (Doeringer and Piore
1971).  In-house development of such skills requires em-
ployers to invest in training employees.  Whereas employees
may be inclined to invest in nonspecific skills that can be
transferred to other job situations, they have no motivation to
invest in organization-specific skills.  Development of such
skills also tends to be expensive because economies of scale
cannot be leveraged.  Furthermore, employees need to be
adequately compensated so that they do not leave once the
employer has invested in training them.  Organizations with
scarce resources are unable to make such investments in their
human capital.  Public sector pay scales are notoriously
curtailed by legislative bodies and subject to strict budgetary
scrutiny (Bretschneider 1990).
This relationship between munificence and asset specificity is
not limited to human capital alone.  When resources are
limited, as they typically are in government organizations,
capital outlays are more difficult than are operational outlays.
Outsourcing offers the opportunity for resource-poor organi-
zations to convert capital outlays into operational expenses
(Apte et al. 1997).  Given the salience of asset-specific
functions to the organization, as asset specificity increases, so
too does the organization’s attentiveness to developing and
supporting the function through outsourcing.
Uncertainty
Contravening the TCE heuristic, transaction uncertainty also
had a positive effect on outsourcing across both institutional
contexts.  In the presence of regulatory pressures, firms cope
with uncertainty by outsourcing (Ang and Cummings 1997).
The public sector has historically faced mounting regulatory
pressure to outsource (Linowes 1988).  Given the resource
scarcity of government environments, it is reasonable that
managers would attempt to mitigate heightened uncertainty
with increasing responsiveness to regulatory pressures to
outsource.  Furthermore, city governments’ limited budgets
are derived from previous year’s expenditures (Lauth 1978).
Within this resource-allocation structure, unplanned resource
allocations are less possible.  Outsourcing makes expenses
more predictable over the contract duration (Grover et al.
1996).  Such predictability will minimize the need for im-
promptu allocations or having to cope with the consequences
of system delays or downtime.  Uncertainty engenders incre-
mental approaches in decision making (Mone et al. 1998).
Such an incremental strategy ensures that gains from IT
investments in outsourcing can be observed before additional
commitments are made.  Recruiting employees, on the other
hand, and other internal allocations necessitate commitments
of resources that are not easily retrenched.  Furthermore,
uncertainty encourages imitative behavior (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983), and imitation under conditions of uncertainty
is beneficial in imposing order on the organization (Levitt and
Nass 1989).  Such isomorphism has been found to be higher
in government organizations than in the private sector (Gupta
et al. 1994).  Therefore, when faced with uncertainty, decision
makers can be expected to follow prevailing wisdom that sug-
gests outsourcing to ensure predictable resource allocations.
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Opportunism
Anticipated opportunism was found to have a significantly
negative effect on outsourcing within professional govern-
ments.  This supports the assumption of TCE that decision
makers’ expectations of partner opportunism will dissuade the
externalization of the transaction.  Among political govern-
ments, while the effect was positive as anticipated, it was
insignificant.  This could be attributable to concern for exter-
nal opportunism competing with a concern for internal oppor-
tunism.  While the latter was believed to prevail within
political governments, a concern for opportunism by vendors
cannot be excluded.  This may have weakened the positive
effect of anticipated vendor opportunism on outsourcing.
Bounded Rationality
The anticipated negative effect of bounded rationality was
observed among professional governments.  However, this
effect was insignificant.  Again, this is likely attributable to
the concerns for the economic viability of outsourcing under
conditions of bounded rationality competing with concerns
about an internal entity with control over information pro-
cessing resources.  The anticipated positive effect of bounded
rationality on outsourcing among political governments was
observed to be significant.
Frequency
High frequency transactions were more likely to be out-
sourced in professional governments.  This supports the
premise of TCE that, by enabling learning and scale econo-
mies in transaction costs, high frequency transactions mini-
mize overall costs of information impactedness (Williamson
1985).  Among political governments, high frequency trans-
actions were less likely to be outsourced.  This supports our
expectation of the prevalence of a political, rather than
economic, logic within political contexts as decision makers
seek to forestall hostility from constituents who are opposed
to large-scale outsourcing and the accompanying loss of
public sector jobs.
Implications for Research
Researchers who have applied TCE to the study of IS
outsourcing have expressed a concern about the limited
explanatory power of the transaction cost logic in relation to
IS outsourcing (Ang and Straub 1998).  Our study findings
indicate that the main effects of the TCE constructs accounted
for 19.3 percent of the variance in IS outsourcing ()R2 for
Model 3 in Table 9); the hypothesized moderated effects of
the institutional context accounted for an additional 8.4
percent of the variance in IS outsourcing ()R2 for Model 4).
Collectively, the TCE constructs thus accounted for more than
25 percent of the overall variance in IS outsourcing alloca-
tions in city governments.  These findings suggest that a more
comprehensive investigation of TCE logic, and one tempered
by an understanding of the institutional contexts underlying
decision making, does indeed enable the theory to afford a
stronger explanation of boundary decisions.  Consistent with
work by Steensma and Corley (2001), our findings also
suggest the need for considering the effects of organizations’
resource context in their application of the TCE heuristic to
boundary decisions.
Implications for Practitioners
Our research findings provide some important insights for
practitioners.  First, unlike the private sector, city govern-
ments tend to outsource asset-specific functions due to the
relative paucity of their organization, specifically, the restric-
tion of pay scales that makes it difficult to attract qualified IT
personnel.  Second, the positive relationship between uncer-
tainty and outsourcing may be attributed to the budgetary
processes.  Outsourcing reduces cost uncertainty in the short-
term, which can be a powerful motivation for decision makers
looking to get reelected.  Furthermore, outsourcing potentially
externalizes the locus of responsibility, enabling government
decision makers to sidestep blame should things go wrong.  It
is useful for vendors to understand these heuristics underlying
outsourcing decisions in city governments so as to be better
able to meet the needs of this distinctive clientele.
Next, we note that the effects of human frailty conditions (i.e.,
opportunism and bounded rationality), as well as of trans-
action frequency, are contingent on the institutional context.
The relevance of this institutionally contingent logic is not
limited to the public sector.  Variations in professional and
political norms are not restricted to the public sector; firms
too differ in this regard (e.g., Dean and Sharfman 1996).
Similarly, variations exist in the plurality of principals in the
private sector.  While private sector agents are typically
believed to be responsible to stockholders only, they are
increasingly held to account by multiple other principals:
customers, employees, regulatory bodies, etc. (Dixit 1997).
A multiplicity of principals, and a consequent plurality in
organizing logic, has also been noted in industries such as
restaurant chains that rely on franchise arrangements (Bradach
1997).  Finally, firms also differ in the extent to which they
are inclined to be attentive to reference groups (e.g.,
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DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  Our contextualized exploration
of TCE logic therefore has implications for private sector
managers as well.  Our findings also suggest that vendors who
are attentive to such motivations for outsourcing underlying
different institutional contexts may be better able to serve
clients’ needs.
Limitations
Our study is not without its limitations though.  While our test
of TCE is more comprehensive than those undertaken before,
it is still not entirely comprehensive.  The theory of trans-
action costs suggests that given conditions of human oppor-
tunism and bounded rationality, these costs accrue based on
situations of transaction specificity and uncertainty, and may
be mitigated in the case of frequently occurring transactions.
The transaction costs then influence boundary decisions.  A
complete test of this logic would entail the exploration of
transaction costs as a mediator of the effects of asset speci-
ficity, uncertainty, opportunism, bounded rationality, and
frequency on outsourcing.  Notably, frequency also impacts
boundary decisions through production costs, as represented
in Figure A1 (Appendix A).  Our study design, which did not
assess the transaction cost construct itself, but rather investi-
gated the direct effects of the source conditions on out-
sourcing, precludes us from concluding the extent to which
frequency is salient to boundary decisions because of its
impact on transaction costs instead of production costs.
While we attempted to develop survey items based on
existing theory, further development and validation of scales
is warranted.  The two-item frequency measure that speaks to
the IS function rather than to the transaction is potentially the
most problematic.  These scale limitations should be con-
sidered in interpreting our findings.
The issue of metrics arises with regard to institutional con-
texts too.  Although the measures used to assess the institu-
tional context of city governments were subject to a fairly
rigorous validation process, there is little existing research
that provides guidance on the operationalization of regulatory,
cognitive, and normative structures internal to organizations.
Furthermore, our operationalization was specific to the city
government contexts being studied.  This is particularly
evident in our operationalization of the normative structure as
mayor–council or council–manager types.  In studying
cognitive structures, a study of for-profit organizations may
wish to contrast the different types of strategic reference
groups or the manner in which they are referenced, rather than
the extent to which an organization references such groups.
Finally, in looking at regulatory structures in for-profit
organizations, it may be more meaningful to consider the
different types of regulatory bodies that exist, rather than the
extent to which the firm is regulated by different consti-
tuencies.  As such, future research may not be able to simply
utilize the metrics developed here in studying other types of
organizational environments.
Contributions and Suggestions
for Future Research
Our research highlighted specific structures that are consti-
tutive of decision makers’ institutional context.  Unlike earlier
research that viewed institutional structures as independent
moderators of the effects of TCE (e.g., Ang and Cummings
1997), we considered the moderating effect of these holistic
institutional contexts on boundary decisions.  This framing of
institutional structures and our research findings can serve as
a basis for further empirical work on institutional contexts and
organizational boundary decisions.
Our approach to considering the intersection of institutional
logic and TCE logic is novel even in the literature on
economic institutions.  Whereas institutional mitigation of the
logic of transaction costs is believed to hinge on fostering
extra-organizational cooperation on exchanges otherwise
susceptible to transaction costs (e.g., North 1990), here we
viewed the political institution as one that defies the logic of
TCE, not because of its cooperation-engendering properties,
but rather because of its level of internal competition and
contention.  This is an important insight that merits further
investigation.
The discussion of our study findings suggests theoretical
refinements of transaction cost economics.  Specifically, it
suggests that a complete operationalization of the TCE model
can add to our understanding of boundary decisions.
Research should further operationalize all TCE constructs,
including transaction costs itself, so as to more compre-
hensively test the TCE model.  Furthermore, institutional
contexts circumscribe decision makers’ application of TCE
logic to organizational boundary decisions.  Future research
should elaborate on the gestalt of institutional contexts
developed here:  identifying additional gestalt and constitutive
structures.  Our findings with regard to the positive effects of
asset specificity and uncertainty on outsourcing suggest that
the logic of transaction costs alone is inadequate in
understanding the effects of situational conditions; they also
need to be considered in terms of resource munificence and
slack (Steensma and Corley 2001).  In particular, labor market
and human capital theories may prove useful in explaining the
outsourcing phenomenon (Doeringer and Piore 1971).
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The institutional distinctions drawn based on normative,
cognitive, and regulatory structures further suggest that the
public or private sector dichotomy may be an artificial one.
Instead, it is plausible that all organizations occupy some
place on a continuum constituted by such institutional struc-
tures.  Finally, our work suggests that juxtaposing diverse
theoretical perspectives can shed considerable light on a
phenomenon that has been extensively studied before.
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Appendix A
Overview of the Transaction Cost Explanation of Governance Decisions
In addition to the five core antecedents of transaction costs (i.e., asset specificity, uncertainty, opportunism, bounded rationality, and frequency),
IS outsourcing researchers have included several others in TCE-based studies.  As depicted in the nomological network in Figure A1, these
other constructs overlap definitionally with the five core constructs, are indicators of those conditions, or are unrelated to the logic of transaction
costs.
In Williamson’s (1975) early analysis, the small numbers condition appeared as one of the four core antecedents of transaction costs.  In
describing ex ante and ex post small numbers conditions, Williamson (p. 29) refers to the “idiosyncratic” nature of transactions, which gives
rise to monopolistic conditions, and subsequently to haggling, either at the outset or following the onset of the relationship.  In these descriptions
of the small numbers condition, the underlying condition is clearly asset specificity, which is apparent also in his discussion of the “uniqueness”
underlying such transactions (p. 205).  In later versions of TCE, the concept of asset specificity replaces the small numbers condition.  Supplier
presence, as assessed in work by Ang and Cummings (1997), represents an indicator of the prevalence of the small numbers condition.
“Complexity” appears in Williamson’s formulation of TCE as a construct that is not independent of uncertainty.  In their definitions, the two
constructs overlap, with complexity being defined as the inability to develop a “complete decision tree” (p. 23).  Williamson’s discussion then
focuses largely on the uncertainty construct, rather than on complexity.
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4While Williamson acknowledges the importance of production costs, these are not central to his theses on transaction cost economics, but rather represent TCE’s
point of departure from conventional microeconomics or “textbook orthodoxy” (Winter 1991).
5Other than calculative trust, which is within the purview of economic rationality, other bases of trust and institutional considerations are definitionally within
the purview of socio-cultural rationality (Williamson 1996).  In Williamson’s formulation of transaction costs, “it is redundant at best and can be misleading to
use the term ‘trust’ to describe commercial exchange for which cost-effective safeguards have been devised….Calculative trust is a contradiction in terms” (1996,
p. 256).  The logic of calculative trust is at odds with the premise of transaction costs because calculative trust cannot exist given conditions of opportunism,
bounded rationality, asset specificity, and uncertainty.  Under such conditions, a decision maker cannot rationally assume a position of vulnerability with an
expectation that the other will behave in a benevolent fashion; given the likelihood of the other’s opportunism and one’s own inability to mitigate this downside
risk with well-structured controls, trust cannot be a rational choice.  Trust must therefore derive from systems other than the economic system (i.e., from
institutional and social systems).
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Figure A1.  TCE Nomological Network
TCE-based outsourcing literature has also explored production costs,4 slack resources, the role of trust5 and reputation, institutional influences,
and access to knowledge.  As indicated in Figure A1, these constructs are not relevant to the logic of transaction cost economics, but rather
provide alternate explanations for governance or boundary decisions.  The logic for these constructs lies in conventional micro-economic theory,
ideas of socio-cultural embeddedness, and the knowledge-based perspective respectively.  While some researchers have explored the mitigating
effects of these constructs on transaction costs (e.g., trust—Dyer and Chu 2003) and the enhanced explanation afforded by combining TCE
and other perspectives (e.g., knowledge-based perspective—Afuah 2001), these perspectives are not part of the TCE logic.  However, in keeping
with the multi-theoretic paradigm of research such as Ang and Cummings (1997) and Afuah (2001), our intent is to look to institutional theory
for an augmentation of the explanation provided by TCE.
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